American Airlines Flight 77:Timeline
September 11 8:13 a.m.-9:28 a.m. In the event of a hijacking, all airline pilots are trained to key an emergency four-digit code into their plane’s transponder. This would surreptitiously alert air traffic controllers, causing the letters “HJCK” to appear on their screens. 9/13/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/13/2001; NEWS (PORTUGAL), 8/3/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17-18 The action, which pilots should take the moment a hijack situation is known, only takes seconds to perform. SCIENCE MONITOR, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001 Yet during the hijackings of flights 11, 175, 77, and 93, none of the pilots do this. 9/11/2001 8:20 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Takes Off 10 Minutes Late Flight 77 departs Dulles International Airport, ten minutes after its 8:10 scheduled departure time. POST, 9/12/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 8/21/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 (8:45 a.m.-9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Secret Service Does Not Use Its Stinger Missiles to Protect New York and Washington In New York, the Secret Service has a missile secretly stored in the World Trade Center, to be used to protect the president if the city were attacked when he visits it. Presumably it keeps this is in WTC Building 7, where its field office is. TV, 7/23/2002; WEISS, 2003, PP. 379 Whether the Secret Service makes any attempt at defending New York from the two attacking planes with its Stinger missile is unknown. The agency is also known to have air surveillance capabilities. These include a system called Tigerwall, which provides “early warning of airborne threats” and “a geographic display of aircraft activity” (see (September 2000 and after)). And according to Barbara Riggs, who is in the Secret Service’s Washington, DC headquarters on this day, the agency is “able to receive real time information about other hijacked aircraft,” through “monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA.” DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 9/2000, PP. 28 ; PCCW NEWSLETTER, 3/2006; STAR-GAZETTE (ELMIRA), 6/5/2006 These capabilities would presumably be of use if the Secret Service wanted to defend the World Trade Center. Furthermore, according to the British defense publication Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence, “the American president’s residences in Washington and elsewhere are protected by specialist Stinger teams in case of an aerial attack by terrorist organizations.” LAND-BASED AIR DEFENCE, 10/13/2000 Knight Ridder has previously reported “several sources” telling it, “Stinger missiles are in the Secret Service’s arsenal.” RIDDER, 9/12/1994 And according to the London Telegraph, the Secret Service is “believed to have a battery of ground-to-air Stinger missiles” ready to defend the White House. TELEGRAPH, 9/16/2001 Flight 77 reportedly comes within four miles of the White House before turning toward the Pentagon. NEWS, 10/24/2001; USA TODAY, 8/13/2002Whether the Secret Service makes any attempt at defending the place with its Stinger missiles is unknown. However, the Washington Post will later claim it is an “urban legend that Stinger missiles are mounted on the White House roof.” POST, 4/4/2002 (Between 8:48 a.m. and 9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley Air Force Base Pilots Learn of WTC Crash At Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, the operations manager with the unit that is involved in NORAD’s air defense mission first learns that a plane has hit the World Trade Center in a phone call from his fiancée. He then receives a call from the unit’s intelligence officer, who warns that the pilots at Langley need to “get ready.” 2008, PP. 116-117 The alert unit at Langley Air Force Base is a small detachment from the North Dakota Air National Guard’s 119th Fighter Wing, which is based in Fargo, ND. YORK TIMES, 11/15/2001; ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/27/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 114 Captain Craig Borgstrom is its operations manager. In the event of an order to scramble the unit’s two F-16s that are kept on “alert,” his job would be to man the battle cab and serve as the supervisor of flying (SOF), being responsible for getting any necessary information about the mission to the pilots. Borgstrom’s fiancée, Jen, calls him at the base and asks, “Did you hear that some airplane just ran into the World Trade Center?” 2008, PP. 116; TAMPA TRIBUNE, 6/8/2008 This is the first that Borgstrom has heard about the attack. 2002, PP. 63 He replies, “Probably some idiot out sightseeing or someone trying to commit suicide in a ,” but Jen tells him, “It’s a pretty big fire for a small airplane.” The chief enlisted manager then enters Borgstrom’s office and informs him that Darrin Anderson, the unit’s intelligence officer, is on the phone from the wing’s base in Fargo, “and needs to talk to you right away.” Borgstrom heads to the main reception desk and takes the call. After asking if Borgstrom is aware of what happened in New York, Anderson tells him, “We think there might be more to this, so you guys get ready.” Borgstrom tells the chief enlisted manager about this call and then heads out toward the alert hangars. Meanwhile, in one of the hangars, the crew chief goes upstairs with some information for Major Dean Eckmann, who is one of the pilots on alert duty. Eckmann is unaware of events in New York. When his crew chief informs him a plane has hit the WTC, he replies: “Poor, dumb sucker. I hope no one in the building got hurt.” Before Eckmann has a chance to switch on the television to check the news, a Klaxon horn sounds, indicating that the two alert pilots at Langley are to go to “battle stations.” 2002, PP. 64; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 116-117 According to the 9/11 Commission, this battle stations signal occurs at 9:09 a.m. (see (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Eckmann, along with Borgstrom and another of the unit’s pilots, will take off in order to defend Washington, D.C. at 9:30 a.m. (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). ; RIP CHORD, 12/31/2006] 8:50 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Establishes Phone Bridges, Including with the Military, Earlier than Claimed by 9/11 Commission According to a statement by two high-level FAA officials, “Within minutes after the first aircraft hit the World Trade Center, the FAA immediately established several phone bridges telephone conference calls that included FAA field facilities, the FAA command center, FAA headquarters, Department, the Secret Service, and other government agencies.” The FAA shares “real-time information on the phone bridges about the unfolding events, including information about loss of communication with aircraft, loss of transponder signals, unauthorized changes in course, and other actions being taken by all the flights of interest, including Flight 77. Other parties on the phone bridges in turn shared information about actions they were taken.” The statement says, “The US Air Force liaison to the FAA immediately joined the FAA headquarters phone bridge and established contact with NORAD on a separate line.” COMMISSION, 5/23/2003 Another account says the phone bridges are “quickly established” by the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC). This is a small office at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center, which is staffed by three military officers at the time of the attacks (see (Between 8:48 a.m. 9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). It serves as the center’s liaison with the military. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, the phone bridges link “key players, such as NORAD’s command center, area defense sectors, key FAA personnel, airline operations, and the NMCC.” WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6/10/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 According to an FAA transcript of employee conversations on 9/11, one of the phone bridges, between the FAA Command Center, the operations center at FAA headquarters, and air traffic control centers in Boston and New York, begins before Flight 11 hits the World Trade Center at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001). AVIATION AUTHORITY, 10/14/2003, PP. 3-10 If these accounts are correct, it means someone at NORAD should learn about Flight 77 when it deviates from its course (see (8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001). However, the 9/11 Commission will later claim that the FAA teleconference is established about 30 minutes later (see (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). The Air Force liaison to the FAA will claim she only joins it after the Pentagon is hit (see (Shortly After 9:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 8:51 a.m September 11, 2001: Last Radio Contact with Flight 77 The last radio contact with Flight 77 is made when a pilot asks for clearance to fly higher. However, six minutes later, the plane fails to respond to a routine instruction. Presumably, it is hijacked during that time. Indianapolis flight control center is handling the plane by this time. YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; GUARDIAN, 10/17/2001; BOSTON GLOBE, 11/23/2001; (Shortly After 8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Pentagon Command Center Possibly Knows Flight 77 Is Hijacked, yet NEADS Not Notified An article in the New York Times will later suggest that officials in the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) promptly become aware of the problems with Flight 77, long before NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) is alerted to the flight. The article will state, “During the hour or so that American Airlines Flight 77 is under the control of hijackers, up to the moment it struck the west side of the Pentagon, military officials in NMCC are urgently talking to law enforcement and air traffic control officials about what to do.” YORK TIMES, 9/15/2001 This appears consistent with what would be expected under normal procedures. According to the FAA’s acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger: “Prior to 9/11, FAA’s traditional communication channel with the military during a crisis had been through the National Military Command Center (NMCC). They were always included in the communication net that was used to manage a hijack incident.” He will say that, since the FAA does not have direct dedicated communication links with NORAD, in a hijack scenario the NMCC has “the responsibility to coordinate Defense Department‘s response to requests from the FAA or the FBI.” COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 NEADS reportedly is not alerted to Flight 77 until significantly later: at 9:24 a.m. by some accounts (see (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001), or, according to other accounts, at 9:34 a.m., when it only learns that Flight 77 is missing (see 9:34 a.m. September 11, 2001). AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/18/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 (8:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 77 Veers Off Course Flight 77 from Washington begins to go off course over southern Ohio, turning to the southwest. POST, 9/12/2001; NEWSDAY, 9/23/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 8:58 a.m. September 11, 2001: Indianapolis Center Informs American Airlines of Loss of Contact with Flight 77 An air traffic controller at the FAA’s Indianapolis Center contacts the American Airlines dispatch office in Texas, and informs it that contact has been lost with Flight 77. The controller is a sector radar associate, whose job is to help with hand-offs and to coordinate with other sectors and facilities. He speaks to American Airlines dispatcher Jim McDonnell. COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 30 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 63 The controller begins, “This is Indianapolis Center trying to get a hold of American 77.” McDonnell asks for clarification, “Who you trying to get a hold of?” and the controller replies: “American 77.… On frequency 120.27.… We were talking to him and all of a sudden it just, uh…” McDonnell interjects: “Okay, all right. We’ll get a hold of him for you.” The call comes to an abrupt end and the controller then continues trying to contact Flight 77. YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 63-64 Soon after this call, American Airlines’ executive vice president of operations, Gerard Arpey, will give an order to stop all American flight takeoffs in the Northeast US (see Between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m. September 11, 2001). By 8:59 a.m., American Airlines begins attempts to contact Flight 77 using ACARS (a digital communications system used primarily for aircraft-to-airline messages). Within minutes, some time between 9:00 a.m. and 9:10 a.m., American will get word that United Airlines also has lost contact with a missing airliner (presumably Flight 175). When reports of the second WTC crash come through after 9:03 a.m., one manager will mistakenly shout, “How did 77 get to New York and we didn’t know it?” STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 454; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 31 The sector radar associate at the Indianapolis Center will call American Airlines again about Flight 77 at 9:02, and again speak with McDonnell (see 9:02 a.m. September 11, 2001). YORK TIMES, 10/16/2001 Entity Tags: American Airlines, Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center, Jim McDonnell Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight AA 77 References Originally taken from the historycommons.org timeline. Category:Content Category:Timeline